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P
olicymakers use various indicators of economic activity to assess eco-
nomic conditions and set an appropriate stance for monetary policy. 
A key challenge for policymakers is finding indicators that give a 
clear and accurate signal of the state of the economy in real time—that 
is, at the time policy is actually made. Unfortunately, most indicators are 
initially estimated based on incomplete information and subsequently re-
vised as more information becomes available. Moreover, some indicators 
are based on economic concepts that are not directly observable.
Two indicators of economic activity often used to guide monetary 
policy are the output gap and the growth rate of real GDP. The out-
put gap measures how far the economy is from its full employment or 
“potential” level. The output gap is a noisy signal of economic activity, 
however, because it depends on potential GDP, which is unobservable, 
and because it depends on estimates of GDP that are subject to revi-
sion. In contrast, estimates of GDP growth have the advantage of being 
observable—albeit with a lag. But these estimates are also subject to 
revision as more and better underlying information becomes available.
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Given the possibility that either of the indicators could give an 
inaccurate signal in real time, should one indicator be favored over the 
other as a guide for policy? This article uses a standard model to com-
pare economic performance under a policy that focuses on the output 
gap with one that focuses on GDP growth. A novel feature of the analy-
sis is that it takes account of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal 
interest rates. Previous research ignored the ZLB and implicitly allowed 
policymakers to set policy rates below zero.
The article concludes that policymakers should usually focus on 
the output gap as an indicator of economic activity when policy rates 
are constrained by the ZLB. A policy that focuses on GDP growth can 
lead to more frequent encounters with the ZLB, which, in turn, lead 
to more volatility in output and inflation. In failing to account for the 
ZLB, previous research overstated the effectiveness of a policy that fo-
cuses on GDP growth.
The first section of the article describes the challenges associated 
with using the output gap and GDP growth to guide monetary policy. 
The second section compares economic performance under such poli-
cies in the absence of the ZLB. The analysis in the third section takes 
account of the ZLB.
I.  MEASUREMENT CHALLENGES AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
In monetary policy analysis, two commonly used measures of eco-
nomic activity are the output gap and real GDP growth. While the 
output gap is conceptually appealing as an indicator to help guide pol-
icy, real GDP growth is measured in real time with greater accuracy. 
Recognizing this tradeoff, researchers have examined the use of both 
indicators in simple rules for monetary policy.
The output gap and GDP growth
The output gap is a gauge of how far the economy is from its   
productive potential. Potential output is determined by supply-side 
factors, such as the supply of workers and their productivity. Over the 
business cycle, because aggregate demand may exceed or fall short of   
aggregate supply, GDP may rise above or fall below potential. A typi-
cal story is that during a boom, the economy rises above its productive   ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  65
potential and the output gap is positive. During a recession, the econ-
omy falls below its productive potential and the output gap is negative.
The output gap is conceptually appealing because it is an important 
determinant of inflation developments. A positive output gap implies 
an overheating economy and upward pressure on inflation. By contrast, 
a negative output gap implies a slack economy and downward pres-
sure on inflation. Thus, if available, accurate and timely measures of the 
output gap can play a central role in the conduct of effective monetary 
policy. A positive output gap might prompt policymakers to cool an 
overheating economy by raising policy rates, while a negative output 
gap might prompt monetary stimulus.
In practice, however, measuring the output gap involves two com-
plications. First, potential output cannot be measured directly and 
therefore must be estimated.1 Second, GDP data are regularly revised 
as government statistical agencies incorporate more complete source 
information and new methodologies into the published data. The re-
vised data may differ significantly from the initial release. Research has 
shown that estimating potential output is the main source of errors in 
measuring the output gap (Orphanides and van Norden). A prominent 
example is the Great Inflation of the 1970s. During the period, many 
believed the economy’s productive potential to be higher than it actually 
was.2 This misperception may have contributed to an inflationary bias 
to policy to the extent that policymakers reacted to the mismeasured 
output gap (Orphanides, 2003b).
In recent decades as well, the accuracy of estimates of the output 
gap has been questionable. To illustrate, Chart 1 shows the Congressio-
nal Budget Office (CBO) estimates from 1991 to 2010. The top panel 
shows two series. One series is real-time estimates (dashed line), which 
reflect information available to policymakers at the time decisions were 
actually made.3 The other series is the most recently revised estimates 
(solid line), which reflect information available today with the benefit of 
hindsight. As is evident in the chart, the revised and real-time estimates 
often lie far apart.
From 1991 to 2010, the revisions to the real-time output gap es-
timates were relatively large. The difference between the real-time esti-
mates and the most recent estimates of the output gap ranged from -3.3 
to 3.0 percentage points (lower panel in Chart 1). Moreover, full percent-66  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 1
OUTPUT GAP BASED ON REAL-TIME AND  
REVISED DATA
Notes: The period is 1991:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The output gap is calculated as the deviation of real GDP from potential, 
as a fraction of potential using seasonally adjusted data. Real-time data reflect information actually available each 
quarter. Revised data reflect information available in January 2011. The revision is the difference between the revised 
and real-time series. 
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age-point revisions were common. The mean absolute revision was 1.1 
percentage points. The persistence of the revisions was also considerable.
Recognizing such errors in measuring the output gap, some poli-
cymakers instead favor the growth rate of real GDP to help guide 
policy (Plosser). Since GDP growth only depends on directly observed 
output data, this measure is not prone to errors from estimating po-
tential output. 
Estimates of real GDP growth, however, are subject to revision. 
For example, from 1991 to 2010, the revisions to the real-time GDP 
growth estimates ranged from -2.6 to 1.8 percentage points (top panel 
in Chart 2).4 Also notable was the persistence of the revisions to GDP 
growth, which was similar to that of the revisions to CBO’s output gap 
(Chart 3).5 Still, the mean absolute revision for GDP growth was only 
0.6 percentage point, slightly more than half that for CBO’s output 
gap. In short, revisions to GDP growth are typically smaller than revi-
sions to the output gap.
Implications for policy rate decisions
Errors in measuring economic activity may lead to policy regret. In 
other words, at times the revised data may suggest that alternative actions 
would have been preferable to those actually taken using real-time data.
To gain insight into the implications of mismeasurement in policy 
decisions, the setting of the policy rate can be characterized by two 
simple policy rules. The Taylor rule relates the policy rate to inflation 
and the output gap. A modified version of the Taylor rule, or a growth 
rule, relates the policy rate to inflation and GDP growth. In this analy-
sis, both the output gap and GDP growth are assumed to be measured 
in real time with errors.6
The Taylor rule takes the following form:
ii yy tt tt =+ −+ −
*** () () . απ πγ                            (TR)
On the left side of this rule, it represents the prescribed level of the 
policy rate in a given period. The policy rate is expected to be zero or 
positive because, under normal circumstances, nominal interest rates 
cannot fall below zero.7 Past research, however, has often ignored the 
ZLB and implicitly allowed the policy rate to fall below zero.68  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 2
REAL GDP GROWTH BASED ON REAL-TIME AND  
REVISED DATA
Notes: The period is 1991:Q1 to 2010:Q4. Real GDP growth is calculated as the four-quarter change in real GDP 
using seasonally adjusted data. Trend growth is average growth over the post-1990 period shown. Real-time data 
reflect information actually available each quarter. Revised data reflect information available in January 2011. The 
revision is the difference between the revised and real-time series.
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Chart 3
REVISION TO OUTPUT GAP AND GDP GROWTH
Notes: The period is 1991:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The revision is the difference between the revised and real-time series, for 
each of the output gap (Chart 1) and GDP growth (Chart 2). 
Source: Author’s calculations
On the right side of the rule, three factors influence the prescrip-
tion for the policy rate. The first factor is the equilibrium nominal rate 
of interest, or the equilibrium real rate plus policymakers’ long-run in-
flation goal (i *= r *+ p*).8 The second factor is the inflation gap, or the 
deviation of current inflation from the inflation goal (pt- p*). And the 
third factor is the real-time output gap, or the deviation of real GDP 
from potential ()
*  yy tt - .
The Taylor rule prescribes that policymakers set the policy rate 
equal to the equilibrium nominal rate when the inflation and output 
gaps are at zero. When the gaps deviate from zero, however, dampen-
ing fluctuations of inflation and output requires coefficients a and γ 
be positive.9 Thus, for example, policymakers using the rule will ease 
policy by lowering the policy rate when inflation falls below the goal 
or GDP falls below potential. Conversely, policymakers will tighten 
policy by raising the policy rate when inflation rises above the goal or 
GDP rises above potential.
To use the Taylor rule, policymakers must estimate the output gap 
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errors from estimating potential GDP or inaccurate data on current 
GDP will lead policymakers to set the policy rate inappropriately. As 
a consequence, the policy rate will differ from what would otherwise 
be the prescription based on the later revised output gap estimate—an 
instance of policy regret. Further, “misguided” changes in policy rates 
may adversely affect the economy. For example, policymakers might 
ease policy and fuel inflationary pressures as they react to real-time in-
dicators of a fall in output below potential, only to discover later the 
indicators were inaccurate.
An alternative strategy is to ignore the output gap altogether and 
focus on real GDP growth, using a growth rate rule.10 Such a growth 
rule takes the form:
ii gg tt t =+ − () +− ()
** * . δπ πθ                (GR)
On the right side of this rule, the first two factors are the same as in 
the Taylor rule. The third factor, however, is the real-time growth gap, or 
the deviation of real GDP growth from trend   gg t − ()
* , instead of the 
output gap. In this analysis trend growth is measured by average growth 
over a long period.11
Dampening fluctuations of output requires the coefficient θ be 
positive. Thus, for example, policymakers using the rule will ease policy 
by lowering the policy rate when real GDP growth falls below trend. 
Conversely, policymakers will tighten policy by raising the policy rate 
when real GDP growth rises above trend. Inaccurate estimates of GDP 
growth, of course, will lead policymakers to set the policy rate inap-
propriately.
Nevertheless, it is not clear which indicator of economic activity is 
less likely to lead to policy regret. While the output gap may be the bet-
ter conceptual indicator, revisions may be smaller for real GDP growth. 
The effectiveness of these two indicators as policy guides can be com-
pared using a model of the economy.
II.  POLICY EVALUATION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE 
ZERO BOUND
As discussed in the previous section, the output gap is an important 
concept in monetary policy analysis—but the accuracy with which it 
is measured is suspect. An alternative indicator of economic activity is 
GDP growth. This section uses a standard model to compare economic 
performance under policies that focus on these two indicators. As in ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  71
previous research, the analysis ignores the ZLB. The section describes 
the key features of the model (the technical details are available in the 
Appendix). It then presents evidence that, when using real-time data, a 
policy that focuses on GDP growth can lead to less volatility in output 
and inflation than a policy that focuses on the output gap.
Key features of the model
The standard model—a basic version of the New-Keynesian mod-
el—explains in simple terms the behavior of households, firms, and a 
central bank. Households decide how much they wish to work, pur-
chase goods, and save. Firms decide how much labor to hire and how 
to price their goods. Moreover, as typical in macro models, the output 
gap is a key determinant of the behavior of the private sector and of 
inflation developments. For example, households work less and firms 
lower prices when GDP falls below potential. Conversely, households 
work more and firms raise prices when GDP rises above potential. In 
determining the policy rate, the central bank follows either the Taylor 
rule or the growth rule.
The specification of the Taylor rule generally follows Taylor’s (1993) 
proposal. Both the equilibrium real rate and policymakers’ long-run 
inflation goal are assumed to be 2 percent annually. The coefficients on 
the inflation gap and the output gap are 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. In 
addition, the output gap is measured as the deviation of real GDP from 
its noninflationary rate—determined by the microeconomic founda-
tions of the model—as opposed to the deviation of real GDP from an 
estimate of its trend growth as in Taylor’s proposal. As a result, the mea-
sure of the output gap used in this analysis is closely related to CBO’s 
measure (Kiley).12 Finally, inflation is measured by the GDP deflator.
The growth rule is specified similarly. To make the rules compa-
rable, however, the coefficient on the inflation gap in the growth rule 
is chosen to produce the same output gap volatility under both rules 
in the absence of the ZLB and measurement error.13 In addition, trend 
growth is assumed to be 2.5 percent annually, reflecting average growth 
from 1991 to 2010.
Finally, measurement errors must be specified for each indicator 
of economic activity in the policy rules.14 This analysis considers a case 
with measurement errors of normal size, in which the errors are as-
sumed to have the same standard deviation as the historical revisions 72  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
from 1991 to 2010 (Chart 3).15 Specifically, the measurement error in 
the Taylor rule was taken from the revisions to CBO’s real-time out-
put gap estimates, while the measurement error in the growth rule was 
taken from the revisions to the real-time GDP growth estimates. As a 
result, reflecting the relative size of the historical revisions, the measure-
ment errors were chosen to be generally smaller for GDP growth. Since 
the size of the revisions going forward is an open question, the analysis 
also considers a case with large measurement errors, in which the errors 
are assumed to have a standard deviation 50 percent larger than the 
historical revisions.
In the standard model—and in most macro models used for mon-
etary policy analysis—a policy that focuses on the output gap would 
be expected to be more-effective when economic activity is assumed 
to be measured accurately in real time. Such a policy is more effective   
because the output gap is a key determinant of the behavior of the pri-
vate sector and therefore inflation.
When measurement errors are taken into account, however, a more 
effective policy may be to focus on real GDP growth. Such a policy may 
be more effective because GDP growth is measured in real time with 
greater accuracy than the output gap. As a result, if the real-time output 
gap estimates are unreliable, a policy that focuses on GDP growth may 
lead to less volatility in output and inflation.
Evidence from the model
The volatility in output and inflation associated with each policy 
depends on the size of the measurement errors. Table 1 shows how the 
model economy performs under both the Taylor rule and the growth 
rule as the extent of the measurement errors is varied. As in previous 
research, the analysis ignores the ZLB. Each row shows the volatility or 
standard deviation of inflation and the real output gap for a different 
size of measurement error—none, normal, and large. Also shown is the 
percent increase in volatility due to measurement error.
The table shows the following results:
1. Without measurement errors, the Taylor rule leads to less vol-
atility in inflation than the growth rule—and the same vola-
tility in the output gap. 
2.  With measurement errors, volatility rises under both rules. 
However, it rises by less under the growth rule.16ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  73
3.  With normal measurement errors, under the Taylor rule the 
volatility of inflation rises 59 percent and the volatility of the 
output gap rises 28 percent. In contrast, under the growth 
rule volatility rises only 12 percent for inflation and 7 percent 
for the output gap. Thus, volatility is lower under the growth 
rule than under the Taylor rule.
4.  With large measurement errors, under the Taylor rule the 
volatility of inflation rises 109 percent and the volatility of 
the output gap rises 56 percent. In contrast, under the growth 
rule volatility rises only 26 percent for inflation and 15 per-
cent for the output gap. Thus, volatility is lower under the 
growth rule than under the Taylor rule.
As a result, if the analysis takes account of errors in measuring eco-
nomic activity, the growth rule can lead to less volatility in output and 
inflation. A number of recent studies, using a variety of models, reach 
similar conclusions (Orphanides, 2003a; Orphanides and others; Or-
phanides and Williams; Smets; Taylor and Williams; Walsh). The bot-
tom line is that a policy that ignores the output gap and focuses on real 
Table 1
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF 
THE ZLB
Taylor Rule
Standard deviation (Percent increase)
Measurement errors: Inflation Real output gap
None 0.34 1.08
Normal 0.54 (59) 1.38 (28)
Large 0.71 (109) 1.68 (56)
Growth rule
Standard deviation (Percent increase)
Measurement errors: Inflation Real output gap
None 0.42 1.08
Normal 0.47 (12) 1.16 (7)
Large 0.53 (26) 1.24 (15)
Notes: Shown is the standard deviation in annualized percentage points obtained from a standard model calibrated 
to the U.S. economy (Appendix). Bold font indicates under which policy rule the standard deviation is lower. The 
output gap and GDP growth are assumed to be measured in real time with errors. Three cases for the measurement 
errors are considered: none (no errors), normal (errors with the same standard deviation as the historical revisions) 
and large (errors with standard deviation 50 percent larger than the historical revisions). Shown in parenthesis is the 
percent increase of the standard deviation relative to the no-errors case.
Source: Author’s calculations74  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
GDP growth can lead to less volatility in output and inflation to the 
extent that real GDP growth gives a more-accurate signal of economic 
activity in real time than the output gap.
III.    POLICY EVALUATION IN THE PRESENCE OF THE  
  ZERO BOUND
Previous studies have compared economic performance under poli-
cies that focus on the output gap versus real GDP growth. But the stud-
ies have ignored the ZLB by implicitly—and unrealistically—allowing 
policy rates to fall below zero. While a policy that focuses on GDP 
growth may be more robust to errors in the measurement of economic 
activity, it may lead to a higher incidence of hitting the ZLB. In failing 
to recognize this tradeoff, past research has overstated the effectiveness 
of a policy that focuses on GDP growth.
Focusing on GDP growth may force policymakers to move the 
policy rate more vigorously to offset disturbances to aggregate demand, 
resulting in more frequent encounters with the ZLB.17 A higher in-
cidence of hitting the ZLB leads to a greater volatility in output and 
inflation. As a result, when policy rates are constrained by the ZLB, a 
policy that focuses on GDP growth may become less effective.
Irrespective of measurement errors, the ZLB constrains the cen-
tral bank’s ability to lower the policy rate and stimulate the econo-
my during downturns. This inability to reduce the policy rate below 
zero may impair the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize out-
put and inflation. To illustrate, Chart 4 shows the dynamics of the 
model economy following an adverse shock to aggregate demand.18 In 
the top panel, the solid line shows that the central bank, using the 
Taylor rule, lowers the policy rate to zero in the presence of the ZLB. 
The dashed line shows that the central bank would further cut the 
policy rate to -5.3 percent in the absence of the ZLB. The sizeable   
shortfall of monetary stimulus due to the ZLB leads to a sharper eco-
nomic downturn (middle and bottom panels). In the absence of the 
ZLB, real GDP falls 3.8 percent below potential and inflation falls to 
0.8 percent. In the presence of the ZLB, real GDP falls 6.6 percent 
below potential and inflation falls to 0.3 percent.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  75
Chart 4
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS FOLLOWING AN  
ADVERSE SHOCK
Notes: Shown is the average model response in annualized percentage points to a -3.5 standard deviation demand 
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Table 2
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE PRESENCE OF 
THE ZLB
Notes: See notes to Table 1.
Source: Author’s calculations
Taylor Rule
Standard deviation (Percent increase)
Measurement errors: Inflation Real output gap
None 0.38 1.23
Normal 0.56 (47) 1.49 (21)
Large 0.72 (90) 1.76 (43)
Growth rule
Standard deviation (Percent increase)
Measurement errors: Inflation Real output gap
None 0.57 1.60
Normal 0.60 (5) 1.65 (3)
Large 0.64 (12) 1.72 (8)
In the presence of the ZLB, the volatility in output and inflation 
associated with each policy rule depends on the size of the measure-
ment errors. Table 2 shows the following results:
1.  Without measurement errors, the Taylor rule leads to less vol-
atility in inflation and the output gap than the growth rule.
2.  With measurement errors, volatility rises under both rules. 
However, it rises by less under the growth rule.
3.  With normal measurement errors, under the Taylor rule the 
volatility of inflation rises 47 percent and the volatility of the 
output gap rises 21 percent. In contrast, under the growth rule 
volatility rises only 5 percent for inflation and 3 percent for the 
output gap. Despite the smaller increase in volatility under the 
growth rule, volatility is lower under the Taylor rule.
4.  With large measurement errors, under the Taylor rule the 
volatility of inflation rises 90 percent and the volatility of the 
output gap rises 43 percent. In contrast, under the growth 
rule volatility rises only 12 percent for inflation and 2 percent 
for the output gap. Thus, volatility is lower under the growth 
rule than under the Taylor rule.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  77
When the analysis takes account of the ZLB, the growth rule be-
comes relatively less effective. A policy that focuses on GDP growth 
results in a higher incidence of hitting the ZLB. Irrespective of the size 
of the measurement errors, the policy rate is estimated to fall to zero 
roughly 16 percent of the time under the growth rule. In contrast, 
the policy rate falls to zero roughly 8 percent of the time under the 
Taylor rule.19 Thus, under the growth rule the policy rate falls to zero 
8 quarters more often than under the Taylor rule over a period of 25 
years. A higher incidence of hitting the ZLB leads to a higher volatility 
in output and inflation. 
Chart 5 shows the differences that arise when the analysis takes 
account of the ZLB. The results from Table 1 (without the ZLB)   
appear on the left side of the chart, while the results from Table 2 (with 
the ZLB) appear on the right side. On each side, the white bars repre-
sent the volatility under the Taylor rule, while the blue bars represent 
the volatility under the growth rule. Comparing the height of the bars 
yields the following results:
1.  Irrespective of the size of the measurement errors, the presence 
of the ZLB leads to a higher volatility in the real output gap 
(top panel) and inflation (bottom panel) under both rules. 
2.  Without measurement errors, volatility is lower under the 
Taylor rule with and without the ZLB.
3.  With normal measurement errors, volatility is lower under 
the growth rule in the absence of the ZLB. However, consid-
eration of the ZLB causes volatility to become lower under 
the Taylor rule.
4.  With large measurement errors, volatility is lower under the 
growth rule with and without the ZLB. However, the in-
crease in volatility due to the ZLB is greater under the growth 
rule than under the Taylor rule.
In sum, if the analysis fails to account for the ZLB, it overstates 
the effectiveness of a policy that focuses on GDP growth. Irrespec-
tive of the size of the measurement errors, a policy that focuses on 
the output gap becomes relatively more effective when policy rates are 
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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE ZLB
Notes: Shown is the standard deviation in annualized percentage points obtained from a standard model calibrated 
to the U.S. economy (Appendix). The results from Table 1 appear on the left side of the chart, while the results from 
Table 2 appear on the right side. On each side, the white bars represent the standard deviation under the Taylor rule, 
while the blue bars represent the standard deviation under the growth rule.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
A central question in monetary policy analysis is whether policy-
makers should focus on the output gap or real GDP growth as an in-
dicator of economic activity to assess economic conditions and set an 
appropriate stance for monetary policy. While the output gap is a key 
determinant of the behavior of the private sector and inflation in most 
macro models, GDP growth is measured in real time with greater ac-
curacy. Researchers who have analyzed this issue found that a policy 
that focuses on GDP growth can lead to less volatility in output and 
inflation to the extent that GDP growth gives a more accurate signal 
of economic activity in real time than the output gap. This line of 
research, however, has ignored the ZLB by implicitly—and unrealisti-
cally—assuming policymakers can set policy rates below zero.
To address this limitation in previous research, this article uses a 
standard model and takes account of the ZLB. It finds that, in failing 
to account for the ZLB, previous research overstated the effectiveness 
of a policy that focuses on GDP growth. While a policy that focuses on 
GDP growth is more robust to errors in the measurement of economic 
activity, it also forces policymakers to move the policy rate more vigor-
ously to offset disturbances to aggregate demand, resulting in more 
frequent encounters with the ZLB. A higher incidence of hitting the 
ZLB leads to a greater volatility in output and inflation. As a result, a 
policy that focuses on GDP growth becomes relatively less effective 
when policy rates are constrained by the ZLB.80  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX—DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
This appendix describes the standard model used to compare eco-
nomic performance under a policy that focuses on the output gap with 
one that focuses on GDP growth. The appendix provides the equations 
of the model. It then calibrates the model to the U.S. economy.
Standard economic model
The basic version of the New-Keynesian model embodies three 
equations to explain the evolution of inflation, real GDP, and interest 
rates (Galí; Woodford). 
The first equation is a Phillips curve, which is based on firms’ pric-
ing decisions. It takes the form:
                          
πβ πκ tt tt t Ey y =+ − () +1
* .
  (A1)
It has two parts. It states that inflation today rises when expecta-
tions of inflation tomorrow rise. Inflation also rises when high house-
hold consumption pushes real GDP above potential or, in other words, 
when the real output gap is positive.
The second equation is an Euler equation, which is based on house-
holds’ spending decisions. It takes the form:
  yyEy yi E tt tt tt tt t −= −−− () + ++ +
** () . 11 1 πη
          
(A2)
It has three parts. It states that household consumption today rises 
when expectations of consumption tomorrow rise. Household con-
sumption also rises when the real rate of interest falls. And it might rise 
in response to economic “shocks” that positively affect consumption. 
Such a shock might derive from numerous factors, such as changes in 
consumer preferences, productivity, government expenditures, or other 
temporary factors. The shock, as typical, is assumed to be a first-order 
autoregressive process, normally distributed.
The third equation is a simple rule, which the central bank uses 
when setting the policy rate to zero or positive levels, it > 0 , in each 
period t.20 Two rules are considered.
The first rule is the Taylor rule, or equation (TR) in the text. For 
convenience, it is reproduced here: 
ii yy tt tt =+ − () +− ()
*** . απ πγ 
                     
(A3)
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Accordingly, the policy rate is a function of three factors. The first 
factor is the equilibrium nominal rate of interest, or the equilibrium real 
rate plus policymakers’ long-run inflation goal (i *=r * + p*). The second 
factor is the inflation gap, or the deviation of current inflation from the 
inflation goal. And the third factor is the real-time output gap, or the 
deviation of real GDP from potential. Denoting the revised output gap 
as xyy ttt =−
*
, the real-time gap is equal to the revised gap plus the mea-
surement error,  xxz tt t =+ .
The second rule is a modified version of the Taylor rule, or a growth 
rule. It is equation (GR) in the text, which for convenience is repro-
duced here:
ii gg tt t =+ − () +− ()
** * . δπ πθ 
                    
(A4)
On the right side of this rule, the first two factors are the same as in 
the Taylor rule. The third factor, however, is the real-time growth gap, 
or the deviation of real GDP growth from trend, instead of the output 
gap. Real growth is simply the change in real GDP, gt = ∆ yt. Real-
time growth is equal to revised growth plus the measurement error,
 gg ttt =+ ν . And trend growth is assumed to be constant and known 
without error.21
Calibration
Table A1 shows the baseline calibration of the model. The values of 
the parameters of equations (A1) and (A2) are derived from Woodford’s 
table 6.1 based on U.S. data, with two modifications. First, the value of 
ϕ represents a lower degree of interest-sensitivity of aggregate expendi-
ture, to not exaggerate the size of the fall in real GDP when the policy 
rate hits the ZLB. Second, the value of the autoregressive coefficient of 
the shock η represents a more persistent shock, to make the economic 
dynamics more persistent.
The values of the parameters of the Taylor rule (A3) are derived from 
Taylor’s proposal. The same values are used for the growth rule (A4), 
with the exception of the coefficient on the inflation gap, δ. To make the 
rules comparable, δ was chosen to produce the same output gap volatil-
ity under both rules in the absence of the ZLB and measurement error.
Finally, processes for the measurement errors were estimated from fit-
ting the historical revisions shown in Chart 3 with a first-order autoregres-
sive process, normally distributed. Specifically, z was estimated from the 
output gap revision, while v was estimated from the GDP growth revision.82  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table A1















AR (1)  coefficient of η  0.70
AR (1)  coefficient of z  0.81
AR (1)  coefficient of v  0.79
Note: Because in the model a period is one quarter, the parameter values correspond to inflation and interest 
rates measured at a quarterly rate.
Sources: Taylor, Woodford, and author’s calculationsECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  83
ENDNOTES
1A related issue is that different methods may provide different estimates of 
potential output (Lubik and Slivinski; Weidner and Williams).
2The staff at the Federal Reserve Board began to compute their own output 
gap measures in the 1980s. In the 1970s, the measures used in Federal Open 
Market Committee discussions came from the Council of Economic Advisors 
(CEA). In 1975, the CEA’s measure stood at -15 percentage points. In hindsight, 
most conventional methods would estimate the depth of the 1975 recession to be 
much smaller. For example, CBO’s revised measure for the period is - 4 percent-
age points.
3Starting in 1991, the CBO director’s testimony before the Congressio-
nal Budget Committee included estimates of potential output. For this reason, 
CBO’s real-time output gap series starts only in 1991.
4The growth rate was calculated as the four-quarter change in the level of 
real GDP.
5From 1991 to 2010, the autocorrelation of the revisions to GDP growth and 
CBO’s output gap was roughly 0.8.
6Although the focus of the article is on inaccurate measurements of economic 
activity, inflation is also measured with error. A prominent example is the defla-
tion “scare” of 2003, which, in hindsight, was overstated (Billi).
7Nominal rates can fall below zero, in theory, if money holdings are taxed or 
financial assets are not freely convertible into cash.
8Like potential GDP, the equilibrium nominal rate is unobserved. In this 
analysis, it is assumed to be constant. In actuality, both of its components may 
change over time. The equilibrium real rate is determined by factors relevant 
for the growth of the economy, such as trends of productivity and employment, 
which are subject to change. Similarly, policymakers may change their inflation 
goal. As a result, the equilibrium nominal rate may also change over time.
9Moreover, good monetary policy typically requires policy rates to rise more 
than one-for-one with increases in inflation. This requirement is known as the 
Taylor principle. It ensures the real rate rises when inflation rises above the goal 
and, therefore, policy leans against inflationary pressures. According to a number 
of theories and historical analysis, failure to meet the Taylor principle could allow 
inflation to become unanchored from the goal.
10Since the sum of inflation and real GDP growth is simply the growth of 
nominal income, this strategy is closely related to nominal income growth targeting 
(Orphanides, 2003; Rudebusch). An argument against the latter strategy, howev-
er, is that the timing of the effects of monetary policy on inflation and output are 
quite different, with monetary policy affecting inflation with a longer lag. Because 
it allows policymakers to react differently to inflation and real GDP growth, the 
growth rule may be a more-effective strategy. 84  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
11Trend growth is also subject to measurement error, which is ignored in this 
analysis.
12CBO’s output gap estimates are based on the production-function ap-
proach. In this approach, the output gap is defined as the deviation of GDP from 
the level consistent with current technologies and normal utilization of capital 
and labor. In the New-Keynesian model, the output gap has a more explicit focus 
on microeconomic foundations.
13Searching for the efficient coefficients, which minimize a weighted sum of 
output volatility and inflation volatility, is outside the scope of the article. To 
make the growth rule comparable to the Taylor rule, the article uses the simpler 
approach of searching only for the coefficient on the inflation gap in the growth 
rule. In the standard model, increasing this coefficient reduces volatility in both 
inflation and output, which, in turn, may lead to less volatility in the policy rate. 
Increasing the coefficient on the inflation gap in the growth rule to 7.0 was found 
to reduce volatility in the policy rate and produce the same output gap volatility 
as under the Taylor rule in the absence of the ZLB and measurement error.
Two other approaches were also considered. In one, the coefficient on the in-
flation gap in the growth rule was further increased to 11.0, producing the same 
output gap volatility under both rules in the absence of measurement error when 
the analysis takes account of the ZLB. The results are qualitatively the same, with 
the Taylor rule becoming relatively more effective when policy rates are constrained 
by the ZLB. But such an approach gives the false impression that the growth rule 
is more effective in the absence of the ZLB and measurement error. In another ap-
proach, the coefficient on the inflation gap in the growth rule was allowed to be 
different in the absence or presence of the ZLB (7.0 and 11.0, respectively). Because 
this implies that policymakers can re-optimize the growth rule to account for the 
ZLB, such an approach overstates the effectiveness of the growth rule. As a result, 
both approaches fail to give a “fair” comparison of the rules.
14The analysis assumes that the aggregate private sector—the sum of all house-
holds and firms in the economy—possesses full information about the state of the 
economy in real time. This implies that the model can be treated as structurally 
invariant under different policies (Aoki; Svensson and Woodford).
15A standard, first-order autoregressive process describes quite well the   
historical revisions.
16The persistence of the measurement errors is almost the same for the two 
indicators, but this does not matter for the result. What drives the result is that the 
volatility of the measurement errors is smaller for GDP growth. 
17This occurs, in typical macro models, because the behavior of the private   
sector and inflation depends crucially on the output gap. As a result, all else equal, a 
policy that ignores the output gap and focuses on GDP growth is relatively less effective. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2011  85
18Shown is the average model response in annualized percentage points to 
a -3.5 standard deviation demand shock under the Taylor rule with the baseline 
calibration (Appendix).
19Under both rules, measurement error may lead to a higher incidence of 
hitting the ZLB. Even with large measurement error, however, the incidence of 
hitting the ZLB rises by less than 1 percent.
20To account for the ZLB, the model was solved using a global numerical 
procedure. The procedure adds a bias term to the notional inflation goal to ensure 
that, on average, inflation reaches the goal.
21It follows that the revised growth gap is simply the change in the revised 
output gap.86  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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